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DA PAMPHLET 27-50-32 . HEADQUARTERS, DEPART~ENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGT6N; D.C. 
·· Doing Away With the Exclusionary Rule 
r.Jy: Major Francis A. Gilligan .and . Captain Frederic 1. Lederer, Criminal Law Di1.1ision, 
.TJAGSA . 
"The . _criminal is . to go free because the con-
stable has blundered." 1 This had been the rule 
in mili~ary courts-martial in~olving ~llegal 
searches and seizures since 1922. Isn't it now 
time to ~evise a better rule-one that both pro-
tects th,e rights of the citizen ~nd yet also pro-
tects th~ innocent or negligent miliiary police-
man or :commander? It is our opinion that an 
alternative to the exclusionary rule does exist 
in the · Ihilitary. · · · · 
:! 
The fourth amendment does not expressly or 
implicitly provide a remedy for its violation. 
The . re~edy the . courts have fashioned when 
there {s ari illegal search or seizure is the 
exclusi~nary rule or suppression doctrine. The 
exclusipnary rule was first applied to the fed-
eral courts in Weeks v. United States; 2 when 
the Supre~e . Court held that evidence obtained 
in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be 
admitted in .evidence at a criminal trial of the 
person· whose rights were violated. In Weeks, 
the Court stated that without such a rule, the 
amendment would be of "no value" to those ac-
cused bf a crime ,and "might as well be stric)ten 
from the Constitution."~ The exclusionary rule 
was nqt held applicable to the states until M app 
v, Ohio 4 was decided_ jn 1961. The military, 
·howe\lier, adopted the exclusionary rule much 
earlier with the Navy adopting it in 19223 and 
the Army in 1924.8 
The exclusionary rule was . set . forth in the 
1951 Manual for Courts-MartiaP and was car-
ried over into the current J969 Revised Man-
ual. a !The first' paragraph of paragraph 162 of 
the present Manual ·provides that - evidence 
that js "unlawfully" obtained is ' inadmissible in 
evidence if the . defense has standing to raise 
the i~sue. The Manual also indicates that the 
exclu,sionary rule applies to derivative as well 
as primary evidence. The Analysis of Contents 
ofthe 1969 Manu,al indicates that paragraph 
152 1: was intended to follow the exclusionary 
rul~ as : announced by the Supreme Court. 9 
Similarly the Court of Military Appeals has in-
dicated .that it follows the fourth a'mendment 
standards announced by the Supreme Court. 10 
Thus it can be assumed that the military law of 
the fourth amendment is primarily a reflection 
of the applicable federal civilian law: 
The intent of this article is to focus on the 
necessity for future u~e of. the exclusionary rule 
within the military. The rule itself has been 
also literally enshrined; despite widespread 
protest, in the civilian law .11 Yet it is a rule 
that seemingly allows both the criminal and the 
erring policeman to go . unpunished :while soci-
ety suffers the consequences. The justifications 
behind the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule 12 are two: judicial integrity 'and deter-
rence of improper police conduct. 
Rationale for Exclusionary Rule. 
Courts have often stated that judicial integ-
ri~y requires the . exclusion of illegally obtained 
ev~dence. Arg'l:ling f()r the exClusion of evidence 
seized through illegal wiretapping in Olmstead 
v. · United States, 13 , Justices Brandeis and 
Holmes asserted in their dissenting opinions 
that the issue of judiCial integrity is a moral or 
ethical question not susceptible of easy solu-
tion. In Olmstead, Justice Holmes stated that 
it was not enough for the Court to disapprove 
of the way the e~idence was obtained. Rather, 
he thought it better for some criminal to go free · 
rather than the government "play an ignoble 
part" in admitting the evidence at trial. 14 Jus-
tice Brandeis · said that illegally obtained evi-
dence must be excluded to "preserve the judi-
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•. cial process from .contamination/' ~<If the Gov-:-
ernment be.comes a law breaker," he stated in 
an oft-quoted passage, ~<it breeds contempt for 
law; ... it invites anarchy." 15 In 1968,. the 
Court in Terry v. Ohio 16 reemphasized the 
question of judicial integrity: 
Courts which ·sit under our ·Constitution 
cannot and will not be made a part to law-
less invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered gov-
ernmental use of the fruits of such inva-
sion.11 
While lawyers and judges alike should be 
deeply concerned about the integrity of the ju-
dicial process, English courts have admitted 
such evidence for years is without noticeably 
losing their integrity. )ndeed what integrity 
exists in letting the guilty and potentially 
dangerous escape j1J.stice? 
The second and, we believe, the principal 
justification for the exclusionary rule 19 is the 
deterrence of illegal police .conduct. As stated 
by the Supreme Court: 
The purpose of. the exclusionary rule "is to 
deter-to compel respect for the Constitu-
tional guarantee in the only effectively 
available way-by removing the incentive 
to disregard it. "20 
There is little doubt that the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule owes its existence to the per-
ception that it offered the only chance of deter-
ring improper police conduct. h The courts have 
indulged in two basic presumptions: that the 
rule does in fact deter improper conduct and 
that no reasonable alternatives to the rule 
exist. Both presumptions are open to serious 
question. At present it seems safe to say that 
most commentators and many of the judiciary 
have concluded that there is no evidence that 
'the exclusionary· rule does deter police miscon-
duct.22 That leaves the second prong of the 
exclusionary rule's support-the absence of al-
ternative remedies. 
Alternatives to Exclusionary Rule. 
Historically in the United States .~he type of 
remedy available in England to,victirris ofpolice 
misconduct-civil law suit against the 
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police 23-has been notoriously unsuccessful. 
Other remedies have been slow to take root and 
it is fair to say that at the time of theM app deci-
sion, let alone Weeks, no viable alternative to 
the exclusionary rule may have e~isted. This, 
however, is no lol}ger the case, whether in the 
civilian world or the military community, A ser-
viceman or woman who believes that a fourth 
amendment violation has occurred JllilY take any 
or all of the following steps: request relief under 
Article 138, UCMJ;24 institute a law suit under 
state substantive law;25 institute suit under sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971;26 institute 
a federal law suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics; 27 submit a claim under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act;28 or prefer criminal charges 
under Articles 98, 133 or 134 of the UCMJ. 29 
The availability of these varied remedies is cru-
cial for if the exclusionary rule is not the sole 
legitimate remedy for a foUrth amendment vio-
lation, it may well be that the exclusionary rule 
could be dispensed with. Chief Justice Burger 
stated in Bevins v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 30 that: 
The [exclusionary] rule .has rested on a 
theory that suppression of evidence in these 
circumstances was imperative to deter law 
enforcement authorities . . . . If an effec-
tive alternative remedy is available, con-
cern for official observance of the law does 
not require adherence to the exclusionary 
rule. 
It is our thesis that viable alternatives to the 
exclusionary rule do exist within the military, 
and that consideration should be given to crea-
tion of a system of remedies that will allow ille-
gal seized evidence to be admissible at trial 
while correcting the mistakes that led to the il,. 
legal· seizure. After all, unlike the fifth amend-
ment (and Article 31) exclusionary rule and the 
exclusion of evidence at trial for irrelevancy, all 
of which is partially based on an assumption of 
unreliable evidence, evidence seized illegally 
under the fourth amendment is perfectly rele-
vant and probative-only public policy prevents 
its admission. It is not within the scope of this 
article to create a complete system of alterna-
tive remedies-that must await an expanded 
3 
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version to be printed at a later time~ However, 
we believe that when combined with the other 
remedies that already exist, creation of one new 
military institution-a military fourth amend-
ment review board to be created at the installa-
tion or division level-would allow departure 
from the exclusionary rule. 
The Review Board. 
lt_is our assumption that military police and 
commanders alike would approve of a local re-
view board that would implement the fourth 
amendment so long as: 
1. There was a clear set of guidelines for 
military police and commanders to fol-
low; and 
2. Military police and commanders were 
represented on the review board. 
The review board would review alleged viola-
tions of a set of model rules designed to render 
the fourth amendment comprehensible and to 
supply implementing authorities with clear 
guidelines as to their legal authority in various 
situations. The rules would he similar in scope to 
the Model Rules for Law Enforcement: War-
rantless Searches of Persons and Places written 
by the Project on Law Enforcement located at 
Arizona State University. 31 The review board 
would not have disciplinary authority per se. If 
it found that an individual had committed an in-
tentional or flagrant abuse it would have the 
power to recommend disciplinary action to the 
appropriate commander. On the other hand, ifit 
were to find that a violation of the fourth 
amendment had taken place through negligence 
or ignorance it could recommend that no action 
be taken, that the individual be counseled by an 
attorney in the office of the staff judge advocate 
as to the nature of the mistake, or where it was 
clear from past actions of the individual that he 
was unable, despite good intent, to apply the 
rules to real life situations, that appropriate 
administrative action be taken. Particularly im-
portant would be the board's ability to recom-
mend changes in the local rules to ensure that 
they were as workable as possible in view of th~ _ 
constitutional restraints. The reader may"'' · 
suggest that such a board would be of little use 
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in protecting the important constitutional rights 
involved. However, this is to ignore two impor-
tant points. Firstly, if the board establishes a 
history of failing to take appropriate action, the 
local trial judge will have no option but to bring 
back the exclusionary rule. Secondly, to allow 
intentional or flagrant violation of promulgated 
rules is no less a violation of military discipline 
than any other disobedience of orders or mili-
tary procedure, and certainly our brethen of the 
line would not tolerate such behavior once the 
rules were sufficiently clear to be understood 
and enforced. 
Composition of the Review Board. 
The effectiveness of a review board would de-
pend to a great extent on its membership. The 
board could be composed entirely of comman-
ders or officers. However, a better and more ef-
fective board would probably contain a mixture 
of commanders, military police, and at least one 
JAGC officer. Thus the board could take advan-
tage of the expertise of its members when 
weighing the actions of a commander or military 
policeman (to include the CID) or when consid-
ering changes within the model rules. Since the 
board would be composed of military personnel 
intimately familiar with the realities of law en-
forcement it would tend to be less tolerant of un-
justified error and equally less prone to recom-
mend severe corrective actions solely because of 
an academic mistake. Similarly its decisions 
should be subject to great deference within the 
military law enforcement community. Since the 
police would be policing themselves, our law en-
forcement personnel could take pride in the 
board rather than resenting its actions. 
Procedure. 
' The board's procedure can only be suggested 
in the most general terms. Experience at the 
local level will be essential for proper function-
ing. However, some elements can be suggested. 
A complaint may be brought before the board by 
any member of the armed services in the juris-
diction served by the board who claims to have 
been the victim of a fourth amendment viola-
tion, by any board member or by the defense 
counsel or commander of an individual so ag-
4 
grieved. While an anonymous complaint rnight 
prove desirable we think that it could too easily 
be made a vehicle for harassment and believe 
that an individual making a complaint must be 
prepared for his identity to be made known to 
the board. In terms of general procedure it is 
suggested that the board act pursuant to Army 
Regulation 15-6 and thus comply with all reg~ 
ulatory requirements. 
Promulgati()n of Model Rules .. 
The model rules for search and seizure should 
not hinder the functions of the commander, 
military police, or criminal investigators. The 
rules would be promulgated at the local level by 
the local board after appropriate consultation 
with the staff judge advocate, and they could be 
updated as experience requires. Lest there be 
fear that the rules might fail to comply with con-
stitutional requirements, the reader should 
keep in mind that failure to conform to constitu-
tional minimums would invalidate the board and 
reintroduce the exclusionary rule. Additionally, 
the existence of the board should have no effect 
on the various fiscal remedies that would exist 
concurrently. The model rules would be explicit 
guidelines that could be followed by laymen 
rather than vague principles of academia. 
Benefit of a Set of Model Rules. 
A set of specific guidelines for personnel with 
law enforcement responsibilities would increase 
their efficiency by providing the military 
policeman or commander with as many specific 
answers as can be foreseen. The rights of the 
individual soldier should receive increased pro-
tection since the guidelines would be specific 
enough to prevent predictable fourth amend-
ment mistakesm Placing the rule-making au-
thority in the hands of the experts involved, 
bearing in mind as always that the board rnnst 
comply with fourth amendment standards, 
would ensure realistic and comprehensible rules 
giving ample consideration to local problems and 
interests. Centralized decision making by the 
board when promulgating or updating the rules 
would allow the commander, military police-
man, or criminal investigator to function accord-
ing to the rules and with less fear of the con-
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sequences of making a fourth amendment deci-
sion. 
The use of a review board at post level when 
coupled with a set of model rules would provide 
a reasonable alternative to the exclusionary 
rule. The "police officer's" blunder would no 
longer require that the evidence be suppressed. 
Rather the evidence• would be admissible (ex-
cept perhaps in the most egregious intentional 
violation) and the "policeman" could be subject 
to the type of administrative correction any im-
partial professional law enforcement agent 
would accept. For good faith mistake remedial 
education or simply afull explanation of the 
error might be appropriate. For repeated good 
faith error, possible MOS reclassification . or 
other remedy could be appropriate. And for 
gross negligence or intentional violation, the en-
tire variety of administrative and criminal 
penalties would be available. Thus society and 
the "police" would be protected. Only the crimi-
nal would lose. 
A Possible Scenario. 
While the courts may well accept substitutes 
for the exclusionary rule, they are likely to be 
most hesitant in doing so. It is highly unlikely 
that the military trial bench or our appellate 
courts would allow use of illegally seized evi-
dence simply because a post has promulgated 
model rules and set up a review board. We think 
that for maximum likelihood of success, a com-
mand would have to set up its system and oper-
ate it for a reasonable time period-six months 
or longer-before the government could at-
tempt to persuade the local trial judge that a vi-
able alternative to the exclusionary rule existed 
in the jurisdiction. At that test case, the pro-
secution would have to prove that the board had 
been effective. Proof would require adequate 
evidence of attempts to publicize the board's 
existence, the number and nature of complaints 
brought before it, and the board's action in each 
case. Follow-up actions or lack thereof would 
also have to be demonstrated . . Would the pro-
secution succeed? That would obviously depend 
on the trial judge. For a test case to survive for 
consideration of the appellate courts, the mili-
tary judge would ·have to rule that a search or 
5 
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s~iz~re was illegal but that the exclusionary rule 
dtdn t apply. Further, to do so the judge would 
have to depart from the seemingly clear lan-
guage of the Manual for Courts-Martial. This, 
however, should not be as difficult at it might 
seem. As iJlustrated herein, the military has 
applied civilian fourth amendments standards 
and paragraph 152 of the Manual can easily be 
interpreted as applying only federal fourth 
amendment law including the rationales for the 
exclusionary rule already discussed. Precedent 
for this conclusion and approach can be found in 
the decision by the Court of Military Appeals in 
United States v. Clark. 32 In that case the court 
nullified the plain meaning of paragraph 140a(2) 
of the Manual which requires offer of counsel 
during any interrogation of a military suspect or 
accused, holding that the intent behind that 
paragraph had only been to adopt Miranda. 
Creation of a legitimate alternative to the 
fourth amendment exclusionary rule will not be 
easy. At a minimum it will take a great deal of 
effort and time. It could well prove fruitless at 
any specific installation or command. However 
at the very least creation of the rules and board 
should improve ·search and seizure practices. 
The effort to arrive at a replacement for the 
exclusionary rule will not be simple, but haven't 
too many . criminals gone free already? 
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